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This paper examines behavioural responses by companies to changes in proﬁt
taxation in their home country. It argues that as well as distinguishing real
from shifting responses for proﬁts, it is important to separate the responses
of gross proﬁts from those for deductions (such as claims for past or cur-
rent losses) where these are endogenously related to gross proﬁts declared at
home. This occurs in the UK and many other corporate tax regimes. This
endogenous response can be expected to diﬀer over the business cycle and,
using a microsimulation model of the UK corporate tax regime, it is shown
that this can be important for empirical estimates of ﬁrms’ overall behav-
ioural responses especially, but not exclusively, during cyclical downturns. It
is shown also that endogenous responses of deductions to real or shifting re-
sponses for gross proﬁts can be expected to be asymmetrical between periods
of above- and below-trend growth.Contents
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i1 Introduction
This paper examines a number of diﬀerent behavioural responses by compa-
nies to changes in the taxation of their proﬁt si nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,f o c u s i n g
in particular on the UK corporate tax regime. Such responses can take two
forms. First, there are real responses, whereby activities are transferred to
other tax jurisdictions. The second form of response involves income-shifting
in which the location of economic activity is unchanged but the extent to
which proﬁts and deductions are declared in the home country changes. It is
argued here that it is also important to distinguish between the responsive-
ness of gross proﬁts and that of deductions allowable as proﬁto ﬀ-sets. Where,
as in the UK, these deductions are related to the size of companies’ proﬁts,
it is found that allowing for an endogenous, or automatic, response may be
important for empirical estimates of ﬁrms’ overall behavioural responses.
In examining behavioural reponses to taxes, much use has been made of
the notion of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the retention,
or net-of-tax, rate introduced by Feldstein (1995, 1999). The closely related
concept of the elasticity of taxable proﬁt with respect to the tax rate (rather
than the retention rate) is a central focus of the present paper. Though
this concept was initially proposed as a means of capturing real behavioural
responses to tax reforms, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) showed that the con-
cept can be applied to any responses, including evasion and avoidance, which
cause the tax base to respond to changes in exogenous tax parameters.1 This
can include changing the type of income declared by taxpayers, for example
from self-employed to corporate, and the shifting of declared income, proﬁts
or deductions to a diﬀerent tax jurisdiction.
In the context of company taxation, income shifting, as mentioned above,
is the phenomenon whereby multinational companies can change the extent
to which they declare their global proﬁts in diﬀerent countries in response
1The terms evasion and avoidance are used here to denote responses that have no
counterpart in real economic changes. Avoidance might be described as tax planning
activities which allow some ﬂexibility in accounting for the ﬁnancial ﬂows arising from
real activities, such that these can be arranged in a tax-minimising manner in accordance
with tax laws.
1to diﬀerences in international proﬁts taxation, without changing their real
activities. Empirical estimates suggest that these shifting responses could
be substantial; see, for example, studies by Hines and Rice (1994), Gru-
bert and Slemrod (1998), Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) and Huizinga and
Laeven (2007). In addition, as Markusen (2002) and Devereux and Hubbard
(2003) have demonstrated, multinational ﬁrms’ decisions regarding whether
to locate real production facilities at home or abroad and trade between lo-
cations can be inﬂuenced by proﬁt taxation and hence aﬀect the locations
where proﬁts are earned, repatriated and declared for tax purposes. Real
responses are not conﬁned to multinational ﬁrms. They can also be expected
for purely domestic ﬁrms because increases in tax rates reduce net-of-tax
proﬁts at the margin and so render some previously proﬁtable production
unproﬁtable. In some cases ﬁrms may change to non-corporate status where
personal-corporate income tax regimes diﬀer.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 begins by
deﬁning and decomposing ﬁrms’ behavioural responses. Section 3 considers
the orders of magnitude of elasticities of tax paid with respect to the tax
rate, for individual ﬁrms, using possible orders of magnitude of important
components suggested by previous empirical studies. A major aim of the
present paper is to examine the likely behaviour, particularly over the busi-
ness cycle, of the aggregate tax revenue elasticity with respect to the tax
rate. This requires information about the form of the distribution of proﬁts
and changes in ﬁrms’ proﬁts over time. Use is made of the simulation model,
CorpSim, produced by Creedy and Gemmell (2007b, c); the features of the
model required for the present analyses are described brieﬂyi ns e c t i o n4a n d
in the appendix. An advantage of using this model is that it deals with the
automatic responsiveness of deductions as a result of proﬁt changes. Section
5 then reports resulting numerical values of aggregate elasticities over the
business cycle. Section 6 reports a range of sensitivity analyses. Conclusions
are in section 7.
22 Types of Behavioural Response
This section begins by deﬁning alternative behavioural responses to cor-
porate taxation, decomposing these into real responses, proﬁt-shifting and
deductions-shifting. The context is of a ﬁrm located in a home country, or
tax jurisdiction, which may, at some cost, change its declared proﬁts in that
jurisdiction in response to a change in the home tax rate. This includes, but
is not limited to, moving proﬁts abroad which may or may not involve shift-
ing some aspects of the ﬁrm’s real economic activity abroad. For comparative
static purposes, tax rates abroad are assumed throughout to be independent
of the tax rate in the home country, so that responses to a change in the home
tax rate can be interpeted as reponses to a change in the tax diﬀerential.
Subsection 2.1 begins by specifying the composition of taxable proﬁts.
Subsection 2.2 then decomposes the overall change in a ﬁrm’s tax, in response
to a change in the tax rate, into its various components. Subsection 2.3
considers the likely signs attached to the components, while subsections 2.4
and 2.5 examine changes in the deductions rate and diﬀerences among ﬁrms.
2.1 Taxable Proﬁts
Consider a single company. Gross proﬁts declared for tax are P∗ and total
deductions claimed against those proﬁts are D, so that net taxable proﬁts,
PT,a r e :
P
T = P
∗ − D (1)
Deductions are assumed to be related to proﬁts, hence D(P∗), but the short-
hand D is used here. Suppose, for simplicity, that there is a single tax rate
of t. In the UK system there is in fact more than one rate, but the vast
majority of corporation tax is raised at a single rate. When PT > 0,t h et a x




∗ − D) (2)
and when PT ≤ 0,T(P∗)=0 .T h i sr e ﬂects the UK system of corporation
tax in which losses (negative proﬁts) do not attract an automatic tax rebate,
3but instead are deductable against current or future positive proﬁts within
the ﬁrm or group.2
This paper is concerned with revenue responses to a change in the tax
rate. The notation uses the form ηx,y =( dx/dy)(y/x) to denote the elasticity
of x with respect to y. From equation (2) the elasticity of tax revenue with
respect to the tax rate, in the simple case where proﬁts and deductions do







That is, for ﬁrms with PT > 0, the percentage increase in tax paid is the
same as the percentage increase in the tax rate. This is a simple consequence
of the proportionality of the fax function in 2. For ﬁrms in aggregate the
elasticity is also unity if all values of PT are constant.
However, it might be expected that both gross declared proﬁts, P∗,a n d
deductions, D, would respond to changes in the tax rate. These responses
may be real (in the sense described above) or they may arise from proﬁt-
shifting or deductions-shifting, where no real changes in economic activity
are involved. Allowing for PT to vary as the tax rate varies means that
dT/dt = PT + tdPT/dt, giving the result that:
ηT,t =1+ηPT,t (4)
Thus the main elasticity of interest is the elasticity, ηPT,t,o fn e tt a x a b l e
proﬁt with respect to the tax rate. This elasticity is closely related to the
Feldstein (1995) elasticity of taxable income with respect to the retention

















However, the following discussion is in terms of the elasticity with respect to
the tax rate rather than the retention rate.
2For example, in the UK system, a current loss under one proﬁt ‘schedule’ may be
oﬀset against a current proﬁt under some, but not all, other ‘schedules’. Thus a ﬁrm’s
ability to utilise its losses immediately can depend on the schedular characteristics of its
proﬁts and losses. Further conditions apply to ﬁrms which form part of a group.
42.2 Decomposing Behavioural Elasticities
Allowing for behavioural responses requires the extent to which proﬁts and
deductions are declared in the home tax jurisdiction to be speciﬁed. To sim-
plify exposition of the following analysis, all other taxes, whether for alter-
native deﬁnitions of income at home (for example, unincorporated income)
or for proﬁts declared abroad, are assumed to be constant. At this stage
the possibility of proﬁts from diﬀerent sources (for example, trading activity,
property letting), being taxed using diﬀerent ‘schedules’ is ignored. In this
section time subscripts are also ignored for convenience.
Deﬁne θp as the proportion of total proﬁts, P, which are declared at home.
Proﬁts declared for tax at home, P∗,a r et h u s :
P
∗ = θpP (6)
Similarly, let θd denote the proportion of total deductions which are de-
clared at home, and let E denote qualifying expenditures which are eligible
as oﬀ-sets against declared proﬁt. These include investment expenditures
and accummulated losses. A proportion, s, of these qualifying expenditures
can be deducted, so that declared deductions, D,a r e :
D = sθdE (7)
The deductions rate, s, is analogous to the term used by Devereux and
Hubbard (2003, p. 473) to describe a ‘factor which reﬂects the generosity
of the provision for depreciation’. In the present paper, s represents the
generosity of all qualifying expenditures, not just those on capital. To the
extent that a ﬁrm’s total proﬁts or qualifying expenditures change in response
to changes in taxes, whilst keeping constant the extent to which they are
declared for tax at home, these may be regarded as real. Alternatively, where
total proﬁts or qualifying expenditures remain unchanged but the proportion
declared at home alters, some proﬁt or deductions shifting can be considered
to have occurred.




= θpP − sθdE (8)
5Let α = θpP/PT > 1 denote the ratio of declared proﬁts to the tax base, PT;
this is strictly greater than one as long as there are some declared deductions.











In view of the fact that both weights α and (α − 1) c a ne x c e e du n i t y ,i ti s
not appropriate to think of ηPT,t as a weighted average of the two terms in
curly brackets in (9).
Equation (9) provides the basic decomposition of the elasticity of taxable
proﬁt with respect to the tax rate for a single ﬁrm. The ﬁrst term in curly
brackets, ηθp,t+ηP,t, measures proﬁt responses while the second term, ηθd,t+
ηE,t, measures deductions responses. The four component elasticities capture
the four basic behavioural responses and are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Responses to a Tax Change
Income shifting
Proﬁts h i f t i n g : θp = θp(t) dθp/dt < 0
Deductions shifting: θd = θd(t,s) dθd/dt > 0
Real responses
Real proﬁt response: P = P(t) dP/dt < 0
Real deductions response: E = E(t,s) dE/dt ≶ 0
The willingness of ﬁrms to shift proﬁts or deductions out of the tax net is
likely to depend on the relative costs of each. For example, it may be easier
to hide proﬁts than to inﬂate deductions, depending on the speciﬁcation of
the tax code, the extent and form of enforcement activity, and the available
evasion and avoidance facilities. However, consider the special case where,
t ot h ee x t e n tt h a ts u c hf a c t o r sp e r m i t ,aﬁrm seeks to be indiﬀerent at the
margin between a £1 reduction in tax liability obtained via a reduction in
declared proﬁts, P∗ = θpP, and an increase in declared deductions, D∗ =
sθdE.T h a t i s , ﬁrms would seek to set dP ∗/dt = −dD∗/dt, implying that







6and knowledge of only the real proﬁta n dp r o ﬁt-shifting responses is required.
2.3 Expected Signs
The deﬁnitions above treat θp and θd as propensities to shift proﬁts and
deductions. Unchanged propensities are represented by dθp/dt = dθd/dt =
dθd/ds =0 .3 However, in general the expected directions of change are
indicated in the ﬁnal column of Table 1. Total proﬁts and the proportion
declared for tax at home respond negatively to increases in t.C o n v e r s e l y
total deductions and the proportion claimed at home respond positively to
changes in t and s: increased tax or deductions rates increase the corporate
tax deductions value of qualifying expenditures. These sign expectations
assume that substitution eﬀects dominate any income eﬀects, an assump-
tion that accords with Gruber and Saez’s (2002) ﬁnding that compensated
and uncompensated taxable income elasticities are similar. Furthermore, the
overwhelming majority of taxable income elasticity studies since Feldstein
(1995, 1999) ﬁnd the overall elasticity with respect to the retention rate to
be positive.
Therefore the two proﬁt responses, ηθp,t and ηP,t, encourage a negative
value of ηPT,t and, to the extent that tax rate increases attract additional
declared deductions, when multiplied by α − 1 > 0, ηθd,t generates further
negative eﬀects on ηPT,t which compound the negative eﬀect from proﬁt
responses. This negative deductions eﬀe c ti ss t r o n g e r ,t h el a r g e ri saﬁrm’s
initial deductions claim. On the other hand, if there were no deductions of
any kind, α =1and P∗ = PT, implying that there would be no additional
negative impact on the elasticity, ηPT,t.
Even if the elasticity terms on the right hand side of (9) were to take
similar values across ﬁrms, diﬀerences in α would ensure that ηPT,t varies.
In particular, ﬁrms with a larger deductions base have a higher α, ceteris
3An alternative deﬁnition would be to regard a real-only proﬁt response (that is, no
shifting) as occuring when each marginal tax-induced £ of proﬁt is declared for tax:
dP ∗/dt = dP/dt. It can be shown that for this condition to hold requires dθp/(1 − θp)=
dP/P. That is, an increase in θp, as a proportion of (1 − θp), equal to the rate of total
proﬁt growth is required if there is to be no change in proﬁts h i f t i n g .
7paribus, and hence a larger absolute ηPT,t.4 As a result, proﬁt-making ﬁrms
with a recent history of losses (or proﬁt-making members of a group with large
losses elsewhere) and ﬁrms with large capital allowances can be expected,
ceteris paribus, to have stronger negative responses to a tax change. For
ﬁrms declaring a current loss or zero proﬁt, ηPT,t is of course zero.
The sign of ηE,t in (9) is less straightforward. It is complicated by the fact
that, to the extent that some qualifying expenditures are related to proﬁts,
there may be some automatic response of deductions to tax-induced changes
in proﬁts declared at home. For example, consider the case where a ﬁrm
transfers production abroad in response to a tax change. Some proﬁts previ-
ously obtained at home are now earned abroad. The associated investment
which shifts abroad, previously deductible from proﬁts declared at home, are














E,t;t h i sc a p t u r e sa n yt e n d e n c yf o rﬁrms to











F o re x a m p l e ,w h e r ee n f o r c e m e n to ft a xr u l e sm a k ei te a s i e rf o rﬁrms to gen-
erate additional deductions, rather than shift proﬁts or deductions abroad,
η0
E,t c o u l db eh i g hr e l a t i v et oηθp,t or ηθd,t.
In general the sign of ηE,t is ambiguous. Consider the components on
the right hand side of (12). Qualifying expenditures, E, are likely to rise
while proﬁts declared at home, P∗, are expected to fall in response to an
increase in the tax rate: thus η0
E,t > 0, ηP∗,t < 0. The sign of the automatic
response, ηE,P∗ is likely to depend on the type of qualifying expenditure and
whether changes in P∗ arise from changes in total proﬁts, P,o rc h a n g e si n
proﬁt-shifting, θp. It might also be expected that where the tax code causes a
greater automatic response, that is, a larger absolute value of (ηE,P∗)(ηP∗,t),
4The term ‘larger absolute’ is preferred here to ‘smaller (more negative)’. Similarly,
the term ‘smaller absolute’ is preferred to ‘larger (less negative)’.
8ﬁrms may have a larger shifting response, η0
E,t, to compensate. Where, for ex-
ample, a tax rise leads to more investment and the associated proﬁts shifting
abroad, ﬁrms may attempt to compensate for the loss of capital allowances
at home by shifting other deductions into the home tax jurisdiction where
they have a greater tax oﬀ-setting value.
The elasticity ηE,P∗ captures the extent to which, for given s and θd,
claimed deductions change as declared proﬁts change. This is aﬀected both
by changes in ﬁrms’ economic circumstances and by tax rules. In a situation
of steady-state or trend growth, a value of ηE,P∗ equal or close to unity might
be expected, otherwise deductions would become a persistently increasing or
declining fraction of declared proﬁts over the long-run. However, away from
the steady-state, ηE,P∗ may be greater than unity, for example when, follow-
ing a recession, deductions claimed rise faster than proﬁts. Alternatively it
may be less than unity during booms when past losses are exhausted and
proﬁts grow faster than deductions. In this latter case, ηE,P∗ could even be
negative.5
















This identiﬁes all the components that determine the value of the elasticity,












where this uses the property that:
ηP∗,t = ηθp,t + ηP,t (15)
Equation (14) shows that in the steady state, the value of the overall
elasticity, ηPT,t,h i n g e so nα and four elasticity components. These elasticities
determine the real responses of proﬁts, P, and qualifying expenditures, E
(holding declared proﬁts constant) and the shifting parameters, θp and θd.
5The nature of the tax code generally aﬀects the magnitude of the elasticity ηE,P∗.F o r
example, a condition that deductions can only be claimed against any currently declared
positive proﬁts eﬀectively limits the scope of those qualifying expenditures.
92.4 Changes in the Deductions Rate
Governments can change the extent to which qualifying expenditures are
deductible against proﬁt for the purpose of calculating tax liability. This
was summarised above by the deductions rate, s. The response of the tax
b a s et oc h a n g e si nt h i sd e d u c t i o n sr a t e ,c a na l s ob eo b t a i n e db yd i ﬀerentiating
PT = θpP − sθdE with respect to s to give:
dP T
ds

















where α − 1=sθdE/PT is the ratio of deductions claimed to net taxable
proﬁt. Expected signs are: ηθd,s,η E,s > 0.A l s o α − 1 > 0 if there are
any declared deductions (D>0). Furthermore α − 1 exceeds unity when
D>P ∗/2 and tends to inﬁnity as D → P∗. 6
The expression in equation (17) takes a similar form to the second term
in curly brackets in (9) but with the addition of a unity term. This latter
component reﬂects the fact that, unlike changes in t, changes in s have a
direct eﬀect on the tax base by altering the size of eligible deductions, sE.
The remaining terms in (17) capture the responses of E and θd to changes
in s. There is no automatic deductions response in this case so long as
dP ∗/ds =0 .A s f o r ηPT,t, even if the elasticities on the right hand side of
(17) were similar across ﬁrms, those with larger deductions relative to taxable
proﬁts would have larger values of α − 1 and hence larger ηPT,s.
The elasticity expressions for changes in the tax rate, t, and deductions
rate, s, in (9) and (17) are not symmetric. Thus an equal percentage in-
crease in the tax and deductions rates have diﬀerent eﬀects because, whereas
the tax rate change aﬀects declared proﬁts and deductions, a change in the
deductions rate aﬀects only the latter.
6For tax-paying ﬁrms, declared deductions cannot exceed declared proﬁts
102.5 Diﬀerences in Behavioural Responses Across Firms
The net taxable proﬁts elasticity in equation (13) can be expected to vary
across ﬁrms, both due to inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences in the elasticity terms on the
right hand side of (13) and diﬀerences in the weights, α and α − 1.
As already discussed, the composition of the weights suggest that ﬁrms
with high total proﬁts relative to their available deductions (low α)w o u l d
be expected, ceteris paribus, to display smaller absolute values of ηPT,t.T h i s
would apply to ﬁrms with low levels of losses or capital allowances. Thus,
ﬁrms in sectors with low capital expenditures (such as service industries) or
sectors enjoying better economic fortunes where losses are low, ceteris paribus
would tend to have smaller absolute revenue elasticities.
In addition, deductions rates, s, may vary across ﬁrms. For example,
a ﬁrm’s present discounted value of deductions for a given level of qualify-
ing expenditure depends on its private discount rate, which contributes to
diﬀerent ηPT,s values across ﬁrms (and ηPT,t,s i n c es is a component of α).
Deduction rates are also lower where more of a ﬁrm’s losses are ‘stranded’,
that is when they can only be used in future years rather than currently.
Loss pools, unlike current losses, can only be used to oﬀset proﬁts in the ﬁrm
and proﬁt source where they arose.
In addition to any ‘levels’ eﬀects from initial proﬁt and deduction levels,
proﬁt-shifting or deductions-shifting abroad might be expected to be easier
for large ﬁrms, especially multinationals, both because of their pre-existing
foreign presence, and because they can more readily absorb any ﬁxed costs
of setting up avoidance schemes. On the other hand, shifting proﬁt between
alternative domestic income categories to avoid corporation tax, such as be-
tween self-employment and corporate income, might be expected to be easier
for small ﬁrms which can more readily move between those classiﬁcations.
T h ee a s ew i t hw h i c hd i ﬀerent ﬁrms can pursue real proﬁto rd e d u c t i o n s
responses when tax rates change is likely to depend on the types of real
response possible. For example, where real responses involve shifting invest-
ment abroad or setting up overseas production facilities, this is again likely
to be easier for large, multinational ﬁrms (and hence observed more in sec-
11tors where multinationals dominate). Opportunities for real proﬁt responses
within the tax jurisdiction are likely to be more limited, but could include
changes to employment or corporate status to take advantage of diﬀerent
deductions available under the alternative tax codes. For example, some
deductions which are available only to incorporated businesses may not be
suﬃcient to persuade some self-employed to incur the costs of incorpora-
tion when corporate tax rates are high, but incorporation becomes attractive
when corporate tax rates are reduced. These arguments again suggest that
responses by small ﬁrms and self-employed individuals would be expected
to dominate this type of real response. In aggregate — in terms of impacts
on corporate tax revenues — these latter eﬀects would be expected to be
small, with revenues in the UK, as in most OECD countries, dominated by
a relatively small number of large ﬁrms.
Finally, Grubert and Slemrod argue that ﬁrms which create opportunities
for real proﬁt responses, for example by setting up foreign subsidiaries, are
likely to ﬁnd it easier to enagage in proﬁt-shifting; indeed the two may be
joint decisions. As a result it might be expected that ﬁrms with larger values
of ηP,t are more likely to have larger values of ηθp,t.
3 Illustrative Examples
To illustrate orders of magnitude for the elasticity, ηPT,t, for a single ﬁrm
or group, it is necessary to consider possible values for the components in
equations (13) or (14). Subsection 3.2 ﬁrst examines a number of empirical
studies that can provide a guide regarding orders of magnitude. Based on
these estimates, a set of benchmark parameters are described in subsection
3.2, after which subsection 3.3 presents numerical results.
3.1 Estimates of Response Parameters
This subsection discusses various estimates available in the empirical litera-
ture. These can be used to guide choices in producing illustrative examples
and simulations, where it is necessary to make assumptions regarding the
12key elasticities and parameters in (13), both on average, and allowing for
diﬀerences across ﬁrms.
There are various estimates of the ‘Feldstein elasticity’ of taxable income
with respect to the retention or net-of-tax rate. However, these generally
relate to personal, rather than corporate, incomes. After reviewing various
approaches, Gruber and Saez (2002) claim that best estimates for this are
around 0.4.F r o m ( 5 ) , a v a l u e o f ηPT,(1−t) =0 .4 would imply ηPT,t in the
range −0.13 to −0.27 for t in the range 0.25 to 0.4.
Estimates for various income shifting responses for samples of multina-
tional corporations were reported by Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), Gru-
bert and Slemrod (1998) and Hines and Rice (1994). Using OECD country-
level data on the share of labour income in value added, Bartelsman and
Beetsma (2003) estimated pure proﬁt-shifting for OECD countries on av-
erage. Their ‘back-of-the-envelope’ central estimate of proﬁt-shifting is that
about 65 per cent of additional revenue following a tax rate rise leaks abroad.
Thus the elasticity of declared revenue with respect to the tax rate is
around 0.35.F r o m( 4 ) ,s i n c eηPT,t = ηT,t−1, the implied tax base elasticity
is −0.65. Bartelsman and Beetsma obtained UK parameter estimates close
to the OECD average. This may be regarded as an estimate of the proﬁt-
shifting component, αηθp,t−(α−1)ηθd,t,i n( 1 3 )r a t h e rt h a no ft h et o t a lr e a l -
plus-shifting response. By focussing only on shifting responses Bartelsman
and Beetsma argued that their estimates could be regarded as lower bounds.
More detailed recent estimates for European multinationals, from Huizinga
and Laeven (2007), are somewhat smaller for the UK than those derived from
the Bartelsman and Beetsma results. Their estimate of the semi-elasticity of
reported proﬁts with respect to the top statutory tax rate (of around 1.1 for
the UK) implies an elasticity of −0.33, assuming a 30 per cent corporate tax
rate.7
Grubert and Slemrod (1998) focused speciﬁcally on proﬁt-shifting in 1987
by US multinationals to Puerto Rico, which has a unique tax status viz a viz
7However, the Huizinga and Laeven semi-elasticities are based on proﬁts data in com-
mercial accounts and are not necessarily equivalent to the elasticity measured here which
relates to net taxable proﬁts.
13US tax rules, using a sample of over 200 ﬁrms. Their model allows for both
real foreign investment and proﬁt-shifting to tax havens. Though estimates of
an elasticity are not readily derivable, their results conﬁrm that substantial
real plus proﬁt-shifting responses by US multinationals was mainly moti-
vated by the proﬁt-shifting opportunities which the real foreign investment
provides.
Hines and Rice (1994) examined aggregate 1982 country-level data for
reported non-ﬁnancial proﬁts of US parents and aﬃliates with investments
in tax havens and other foreign countries. They report that a 1 percentage
point higher tax rate reduces reported proﬁts by 3 per cent. Across such a
wide-ranging sample of countries, the corporate tax rate is likely to vary. An
average of around 30 per cent implies an elasticity around −1; a 15 per cent
tax rate implies an elasticity around −0.5.
The Hines-Rice elasticity probably includes both real and proﬁt-shifting
responses and so approximates ηPT,t. However, part of the large observed tax
response arises because of the US system of taxing world-wide income, which
makes this unrepresentative of the UK. The Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003)
estimate, on the other hand, relates only to shifting to other OECD coun-
tries while the Gruber-Slemrod and Hines-Rice estimates relate to shifting
to especially low-tax havens — hence the larger estimates for the latter.
3.2 Benchmark Parameters
Adopting a steady-state value of ηE,P∗ =1allows equation (14) to be used.
The illustrations below also set the deductions rate equal to unity; that is,
s =1and qualifying expenditures are fully eligible as deductions (but there is
no implicit subsidy). Table 2 shows the assumed values of the four elasticity
components and the declared proportions, θp and θd,r e q u i r e dt oc a l c u l a t e
α − 1 in (14). It might be expected that these parameters cannot be chosen
independently by ﬁrms. For example, as Slemrod and others have suggested,
if it becomes more costly to shift further increments of proﬁts abroad, then
ηθp,t and ηθd,t may become smaller as θp and θd are reduced. However, the
illustrations below examine individual parameter changes holding all others
14constant.
Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values
Elasticity Benchmark Alternatives
Proﬁts h i f t i n g ηθp,t −0.375 −0.625
Deductions shifting ηθd,t 0.25 0.5
Real proﬁt response ηP,t −0.05 −0.1,−0.2
Real deductions response ηE
0,t 0.05 0.1,0.2
Proportion of P declared θp 0.80 .6
Proportion of D declared θd 0.80 .6
Deductions rate s 1.00 .8,0.6
The benchmark case assumes a small real proﬁt response to changing tax
rates, of 5 per cent, but alternatives of 10 per cent and 20 per cent are also
examined. Comparable positive values are used for the discretionary real
deductions response, η0
E,t.W i t h s =1and for a given θd, the response of
qualifying expenditures is the same as that for declared deductions. This
response is referred to as ‘discretionary’ to distinguish it from the automatic
deductions response.
P o s s i b l ev a l u e sf o rt h ep r o ﬁt-shifting and deduction-shifting elasticities
could be based, for example, on Bartelsman and Beetsma’s (2003) estimate
of an overall shifting elasticity around 0.65. The benchmark ηθp,t = −0.375,
f o re x a m p l e ,i m p l i e st h a ta1 0p e rc e n tc h a n g ei nt h et a xr a t e( f o re x a m p l e ,
from 30 per cent to 33 per cent) generates a 3.75 per cent reduction in the
share of declared proﬁts (for example, from 80 per cent to 77 per cent). The
alternative of ηθp,t = −0.625 implies a fall from 80 per cent to 75 per cent in
the share of declared proﬁts.8 Deductions shifting is assumed to be slightly
more diﬃcult (smaller) with ηθd,t =0 .25,0.5. The total shifting response is
given by ηθp,t − (α − 1)ηθd,t.T h i s e ﬀect depends on the value of α,w h i c h
8If proﬁt-shifting is driven by changes in the tax rate diﬀerential between home and
overseas tax jurisdictions, the assumed precentage change in the home tax rate will be
small compared with the percentage change in the diﬀerential. For example if the home
rate falls from 25 per cent to 23 per cent (a −8 per cent change) but the relevant overseas
rate remains at, say, 35 per cent, the diﬀerential has changed by 20 per cent (from 10 per
cent to 12 per cent). Thus a relatively large response to a relatively small change in the
home tax rate may not be so surprising.
15in turn depends on the value of E/P, in addition to the other benchmark
parameters in Table 2. Using E/P =0 .5 (so that α =2 ), gives a benchmark
total ‘shifting elasticity’ of ηθp,t +( 1− α)ηθd,t = −0.625.
These illustrative values should not be interpreted as representing ‘av-
erage’ responses, since many ﬁrms’ responses could be expected to be very
small or zero. However they serve to illustrate the responsiveness properties
of those ﬁrms with more substantial behavioural responses to tax changes.
(Possible average responses across the distribution of ﬁrms are illustrated in
section 5).
3.3 Numerical Results
Some numerical results are shown in Figure 1 where each of the four quad-
rants shows the elasticity ηPT,t on the vertial axis and the size, expressed as
a percentage, of qualifying expenditures relative to total proﬁts, E/P,o nt h e
horizontal axis. Each quadrant shows a range of proﬁles for ηPT,t, resulting
from changes in one of the relevant parameters while leaving all others ﬁxed
at their benchmark values. The top left and right hand quadrants show re-
spectively the eﬀects of varying the proportions (of proﬁts and deductions)
declared and the degree of shifting (again of proﬁts and deductions). The
bottom left and right hand quadrants show respectively the eﬀects of varying
real proﬁt responses and real deductions responses.
The ratio, E/P is not observable in UK taxpayer data, but the ratio
of deductions to proﬁts claimed, D/P∗, is observable, where D = sθdE.
HMRC data show this to be around the range 0.45 to 0.56, for companies in
aggregate.9 The benchmark values of θp =0 .8 and s =1then yield E/P in
the range 0.56 to 0.70.
To interpret the diagrams, it is useful to remember that the impact of the
E/P ratio on ηPT,t operates via changes in α in (14). For example, with a
central estimate of E/P =0 .5 and θd =0 .8,t h e nα =2 , and (14) simpliﬁes
9HMRC data on all companies (excluding Life Assurance and North Sea Oil companies)
over 1997-98 to 2003-04 show that the ratio of all deductions (excluding a small amount
of tax credits), to gross proﬁts, ranges from a low of 0.46 in 1998-99 to a high of 0.56 in
2002-03. see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/table11_2.pdf.
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Figure 1: Relationship between ηPT,t and E/P: Individual Firms
to:
ηPT,t = ηθp,t + ηP,t − ηθd,t + ηE
0,t (18)
where (18) also uses ηE,P∗ =1 .
At the extremes, as E/P → 1,t h ew e i g h tα − 1 →∞ ,s ot h a tt h e
elasticity, ηPT,t →− ∞ . And as E/P → 0, the term α − 1 → 0 and the
elasticity is determined solely by the ﬁrst two proﬁt-related terms in (18). In
all the diagrams it is clear that E/P has important, non-linear eﬀects on the
overall elasticity, ηPT,t.
The top left and bottom right hand side quadrants of Figure 1 reveal
that changing θp,θ d or η0
E,t causes the benchmark proﬁle to rotate (around
av a l u ea tE/P =0 ), whilst changes in ηP,t cause the benchmark proﬁle to
shift (the bottom left hand quadrant). The top right hand quadrant also
reveals that changes in the ‘shifting elasticities’ have diﬀering eﬀects on the
17overall elasticity, with an increase in the absolute value of ηθp,t causing the
proﬁle to shift downwards whilst an increase in ηθd,t causes the proﬁle to
rotate clockwise. This diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that the impact of ηθd,t on
the overall elasticity is mediated via (α−1), whereas this is irrelevant to the
impact of changes in ηθp,t.
These illustrations show how diﬀerences in α can aﬀect observed proﬁt
and deductions responses. However, by maintaining ηE,P∗ =1 , they cannot
demonstrate the endogenous impact of changes in declared proﬁts on those
deductions. As is shown in section 5, this aspect is likely to be important
when behavioural responses are estimated at diﬀerent points in the economic
cycle. In order to examine aggregate elasticities, it is necessary to have
information about the distribution of proﬁts: this is therefore discussed in
the following section.
4 Simulating ProﬁtD y n a m i c s
The distribution of proﬁts, and changes over the business cycle, along with
the endogenous variations in ﬁrms’ deductions in response to proﬁts changes,
can be examined using the corporation tax microsimulation model, Corp-
Sim, developed by Creedy and Gemmell (2007c). The relevant features of
this model are described brieﬂy in this section and in the appendix. This
model was designed to examine the behaviour of net taxable proﬁts, deduc-
tions and tax revenues in response to changes in gross taxable proﬁts. It is
b a s e do nH M R Ct a xa n dp r o ﬁt data for the UK.
For present purposes, the model provides estimates of the responsiveness
of deductions to declared proﬁts by UK ﬁrms and the weights, αi. However,
the use of HMRC data necessarily means that the initial input data used by
CorpSim relate to ﬁrms’ declared proﬁts, P∗
i = θpiPi, and declared deduc-
tions used as proﬁto ﬀ-sets, Di = sθdiEi, rather than the Pi and Ei which
were treated as exogenous in the illustrations reported above. Simulations

















α − (α − 1)ηD,P∗
¤
ηP∗,t − (α − 1)ηD,t (19)
where α for each ﬁrm is calculated as αi = P∗
i /P T
i , ηP∗,t = ηθp,t + ηP,t,
and ηD,t = ηθd,t + η0
D,t. Initial values of PT
i,0 are obtained, given an initial
distribution of gross taxable proﬁts P∗
i,0 (discussed below), by subtracting
t h ei n i t i a lv a l u eo fd e d u c t i o n sc l a i m e d ,Di,0,f r o mt h er e l e v a n tﬁrm’s initial
P∗
i,0. This relationship includes η0
D,t > 0, the elasticity of declared deductions,
for given declared proﬁts, with respect to the tax rate. This captures any
tendency for higher tax rates to encourage increased spending on qualifying
expenditures in order to increase ﬁrms’ deductions and hence reduce their tax
liabilities, ceteris paribus. The tendency for tax-induced deduction-shifting
is again captured by ηθd,t.
4.1 Proﬁt Distributions
The microsimulation model builds a simpliﬁed version of the actual UK cor-
poration tax regime which captures its essential characteristics. Using data
on the two main proﬁt sources — trading proﬁts and interest income — for
around 150,000 UK ﬁrms, CorpSim generates a simulated distribution for
each proﬁts o u r c ea c r o s sﬁrms. These are ﬁtted to the actual distributions
using a mixture of lognormal distributions, suitably adjusted to produce neg-
ative proﬁt values, as described in the appendix. The actual trading proﬁt
distribution, for a sample of ﬁrms in 2003-04, is shown in Figure 2. Impor-
tant features of proﬁt distributions are, ﬁrst, the extent of losses (shown by
the long left-hand tail) and, second, the fact that the bulk of ﬁrms lie below
the £1.5 million threshold at which the main corporate tax rate of 30 per
cent applies. Third, the vast majority of corporation tax revenues are paid
by a small number of large ﬁrms in the right-hand tail of the distribution.10
10For example, in 2003-04, the largest 7 per cent of corporate taxpayers contributed 87
per cent of total corporation tax revenues. The small numbers of ﬁrms in the tails of the
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Figure 3: Simulated and Empirical Lorenz Curves for Proﬁts and Losses
20The ability of CorpSim to match actual data on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and losses
can be seen in Figure 3. This shows Lorenz curves for observed (positive)
trading proﬁts and losses, for the year 2003-04, and those obtained by simu-
lation. It can be seen that the actual distributions of both proﬁts and losses
are highly unequal, and this feature is well captured by the simulated equiv-
alents, with the latter displaying slightly less concentration. As a further
check, the aggregate ratio of all deductions to gross declared proﬁts, D/P∗,
can be compared with actual data from HMRC. The most recent (2002-03
and 2003-04) observed ratios are 0.56 and 0.53; equivalent values produced
by CorpSim are around 0.52.
4.2 Deductions
Most large UK ﬁrms form part of larger groups which are allowed to share
some deductions under the tax code, though corporation tax is levied at
the unconsolidated ﬁrm level. The proﬁt distribution data reveal a small
number of ﬁrms with very large losses, almost certainly belonging to groups
in which other members make large positive proﬁts. In fact, it is common
practice for some large conglomorates to arrange their group losses within
one large loss-making company, with these losses then allocated as proﬁto ﬀ-
sets to proﬁt-making group members. Hence, an assumption is made within
CorpSim that ﬁrms form groups consisting of pairs of ﬁrms, in order to take
advantage of the regulations allowing losses to be deducted from gross proﬁts
both within and between ﬁrms in a group. CorpSim d o e sn o ta t t e m p tt o
endogenise group formation. Instead, ﬁrms are allocated randomly to groups
of two, except for those large proﬁt-making ﬁrms generated from an upper tail
of a lognormal distribution, which are matched randomly with ﬁrms making
large losses.11
In addition to losses being deductible from ﬁrm or group proﬁts, ﬁrms in
CorpSim undertake investment which determines the value of their capital
11That is, though most ﬁrms are grouped randomly so that two proﬁt-making, two loss-
making or loss-proﬁt coombinations may arise, large proﬁt-makers are grouped only with
large loss-makers. The matching of large proﬁt and loss makers accounts for 12 per cent
of the total ﬁrm pairs in the sample.
21allowances, with investment assumed to be a positive function of past and
current proﬁts (both trading proﬁt and interest income).12 Though invest-
ment is not aﬀected directly by tax parameters, the extent to which capital
allowances are declared at home is aﬀected by t and s as described earlier.
In addition, any tax-induced proﬁt-shifting aﬀects capital allowance claims
automatically through the eﬀect of proﬁts on investment.
CorpSim employs an range of algorithms to ensure that, given the con-
ﬁguration of group members’ proﬁts and losses, deductions are allocated
within the group in a tax-minimising way, subject to tax code restrictions.
With two proﬁt sources and two ﬁr m si nag r o u pt h e r ea r et e nd i ﬀerent re-
sulting proﬁt-loss combinations possible. Allowing for more than two group
members would considerably complicate the tax-minimising procedure.
As discussed in section 3, though the elasticity of deductions with respect
to declared proﬁts, ηD,P∗, can be expected to be unity in a steady-state, at
diﬀerent stages in an economic cycle ηD,P∗ can be expected to vary, depending
on how capital allowances and losses respond to changing proﬁtg r o w t ho v e r
the cycle. This potentially aﬀects the value of ηPT,t for each ﬁrm at diﬀerent
points in the cycle. The aggregate equivalent, ΩPT,t, is further aﬀected by
changes in the numbers of, and tax payments by, taxpaying ﬁrms over the
cycle. To investigate these aspects within CorpSim, ﬁrms are subjected to
a dynamic process involving a trend rate of proﬁtg r o w t ho nw h i c hac y c l ei s
superimposed. In addition, ﬁrms may experience relative proﬁtm o v e m e n t s
as a result of stochastic changes in proﬁts.13
5 Behavioural Responses in Aggregate
This section uses the simulation model CorpSim, allied with alternative as-
sumptions regarding behavioural elasticities, to examine the aggregate elas-
12A more sophisticated investment function could be adopted here but the present as-
sumption is designed to capture a positive correlation between investment and proﬁts.
One rationale for such a correlation is that imperfect capital markets lead ﬁrms to prefer
internal sources of ﬁnance for investment projects.
13As discussed in the appendix, even without stochastic proﬁt variations, some ﬁrms
experience relative proﬁt movements as a result of the nature of the proﬁt generating
process.
22ticity of taxable proﬁts and hence corporation tax with respect to the tax
rate. The above notation must therefore be modiﬁed to denote aggregates.
Let ΩPT,t represent the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate
for all ﬁrms in aggregate; this equivalent to ηPT,t (or strictly, ηPT
i ,t)f o ra n
individual ﬁrm. It can be shown that the individual and aggregate elasticities












That is, the aggregate elasticity is a taxable proﬁt share-weighted average of
the individual elasticities. An aggregate result corresponding to equation (4)
is also available, so that:
ΩT,t =1+ΩPT,t (21)
To consider the responsiveness of ﬁrms in aggregate requires information
on the decomposition of ηPT
i ,t in equation (13). Firms could vary in their
behavioural responses (the elasticities, ηPi,t, ηθpi,t a n ds oo n )a n di nt h es i z e
of their proﬁts and deductions, which aﬀects Di/P ∗
i and hence the αiso fe a c h
ﬁrm, where Di/P ∗
i =( αi − 1)/αi. Further, automatic eﬀects operating via
the elasticity of deductions with respect to declared proﬁts, ηD,P∗,i n( 1 9 )c a n
be expected to vary across ﬁrms depending on the extent and type (whether
losses or capital allowances) of their deductions.
As argued above, the behavioural response parameters, ηP,t, ηθp,t and so
on, might be expected to be greater for larger and/or multinational ﬁrms
who can absorb the ﬁxed costs of proﬁt-shifting or deduction-shifting more
easily. Without information on ﬁrms’ domestic or multinational status and
size (other than their annual proﬁts), the simulations treat each behavioural
response as common across ﬁrms. This means that the aggregate elasticity
is not computed using equation (20), but is based directly on changes in the
relevant aggregate values. However, in obtaining these results the values of
ηD,P∗, are eﬀectively allowed to vary endogenously across ﬁrms, since each
ﬁrm’s deductions are evaluated in a tax minimising manner, as discussed
above.
235.1 Simulation Parameters and Results
To investigate the impact of proﬁt-shifting and deduction-shifting parame-
ters, and diﬀerences in ﬁrm behaviour, on the aggregate elasticity, ΩPT,t,
CorpSim was run over a ten-period proﬁt cycle described by a sine wave.
In the benchmark simulation this involves a trend growth rate of 2 per cent
per period and a low cycle (with growth in the range 0.4 to 3.6 per cent),
with trend growth observed in years 1, 6, 11, and so on. Benchmark values
for the key exogenous parameters are as used previously, and given in Table
3. This benchmark also suppresses stochastics, so that the trend and cycle
in proﬁtg r o w t hr a t e sa ﬀect all ﬁrms similarly.14
Table 3: Benchmark Values for Aggregate Simulations
Parameter Benchmark Comment
Proﬁts h i f t i n g ηθp,t −0.375
Deductions shifting ηθd,t 0.25
Real proﬁt response ηP,t −0.05
Real deductions response η0
D,t 0.05
Deduction-proﬁt response ηD,P∗ endogenous: from CorpSim
Initial declared proﬁt P∗
i,0 exogenous: initial proﬁt distrib
Initial declared deductions Di,0 endogenous: from CorpSim
Trend proﬁtg r o w t h 2 per cent
Proﬁtg r o w t hc y c l e 0.4 − 3.6 pc Range (low cycle)
(sine wave) 10 Wavelength
The key diﬀerence from the individual ﬁrm illustrations above is that
both αi and the elasticity, ηD,P∗, are determined endogenously. To see how
this aﬀects results, simulations also examine the case where ηD,P∗ =1is
imposed. In addition, though benchmark simulations assume all ﬁrms have
the same behavioural response elasticities (ηθp,t, ηθd,t, ηP,t, η0
D,t), diﬀerences
in the size of ﬁrms’ proﬁts and deductions, generate inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences in
the weights αi.
14Nevertheless, the dynamic speciﬁcation of the model implies that only ﬁrms with
positive proﬁts experience similar growth rates when there is no stochastic component of
proﬁtc h a n g e s .F o rﬁrms making large losses, growth rates are closer to the growth rate
of the maximim possible loss. The precise relationship is described in further detail at the
end of the appendix.
24The role of the aggregate automatic response of deductions to proﬁts,
ΩD,P∗, can best be seen by re-writing (19), for all ﬁrms in aggregate, as
ΩPT,t =[ α − (α − 1)ΩD,P∗]ΩP∗,t − (α − 1)ΩD,t (22)
where ΩP∗,t (= Ωθp,t+ΩP,t)a n dΩD,t (= Ωθd,t +ΩD
0,t)a r et h ec o m b i n e d‘ d i s -
cretionary’ real and shifting responses by ﬁrms and ΩD,P∗ is the endogenous
automatic response.
Table 4: Three Eﬀects on Tax Base Elasticity
Variable Eﬀect on ΩPT,t Magnitude depends on:
ΩP∗,t −ve direct eﬀect Relative size of deductions, α
+ve indirect eﬀect Relative size of deductions, α,a n d
endog. response to proﬁts, ΩD,P∗
ΩD,t −ve direct eﬀect Relative size of deductions, α
Equation (22) reveals three eﬀects on the tax base elasticity, ΩPT,t. These
are shown in Table 4. Both proﬁt sa n dd e d u c t i o n sh a v ed i r e c tn e g a t i v ee ﬀects
on ΩPT,t. That is, the responses of both to increases in tax rates (proﬁt
outﬂow, deductions inﬂow) serve to increase the absolute value of ΩPT,t.
However, there is an additional indirect eﬀect of a proﬁto u t ﬂow, namely
the loss of some deductions that otherwise could be claimed against declared
proﬁt: this reduces ΩPT,t. It can be seen from (22) that the direct eﬀect





This inequality identiﬁes the conditions under which a reduction in de-
clared proﬁts in response to a tax increase (whether via real or shifting eﬀects)
raises or lowers tax liabilities, relative to the case where ΩP∗,t =0 .W h e r e
condition (23) holds, a negative proﬁt response to the increased tax rate has
a lower tax liability than when there is no response. However, where condi-
tion (23) does not hold, the loss of deductions which could be used to oﬀ-set
proﬁts, when declared proﬁts are driven down by a tax rate rise, would have
an e te ﬀect of increasing ﬁrms’ tax liabilities.
25In general, there is no reason to expect (23) to hold since it depends on
how the endogenous response of deductions to proﬁt changes compares to the
relative size of deductions with proﬁts. Both could be determined by diﬀerent
characteristics of a corporate tax system.15 In the UK, in aggregate α ≈ 2
and, as the simulations below show, ΩD,P∗ is always less than this. Hence,
the inequality in (23) seems to hold in the UK and the net eﬀect on ΩPT,t of
ΩP∗,t is expected to be to increase ΩPT,t. Nevertheless, larger values of ΩD,P∗
increase the indirect eﬀect and thus reduce ΩPT,t. To the extent that losses
dominate deductions, larger values of ΩD,P∗ can be expected to be associated
with cyclical downturns. Of particular interest among the simulation results
are the on-trend values of the aggregate elasticity, ΩPT,t (where ΩD,P∗ =1 )for
diﬀerent proﬁt-shifting assumptions, and the sensitivity of elasticity values
to cyclical changes. For example, it is useful to examine how ΩPT,t changes
over business cycles of diﬀerent magnitudes, compared with values involving
trend proﬁt growth. Furthermore, the model can be used to examine whether
alternative shifting assumptions yield diﬀerences in ΩPT,t which are of similar
magnitude at all points in the cycle.
5.2 ProﬁtG r o w t hC y c l e s
Before examining elasticity results it is useful to consider the diﬀerent growth
cycles associated with diﬀerent proﬁtd e ﬁnitions. Previous sections have
highlighted three proﬁtd e ﬁnitions: gross proﬁt including losses, P;g r o s s
proﬁts declared for tax, P∗; and net taxable proﬁts (after deductions), PT.
Though oﬃcial UK data only measure declared proﬁts P∗, rather than P,
this can include losses, as with National Accounting deﬁnitions, or treat all
losses as zero proﬁt s ,a sw i t hH M R C ’ sg r o s st a x a b l ep r o ﬁt data. HMRC also
measure net taxable proﬁts, PT, after losses and capital allowances have been
used as oﬀ-sets.
Figure 4 shows the exogenously set benchmark growth cycle for gross
15For example, the use of past and current losses as proﬁts oﬀ-sets tends to generate a
relationship between deductions and proﬁts. However, the introduction of other deductions
which may be unrelated to proﬁts, or changes in qualifying expenditures, can raise the
level of total deductions allowable against proﬁts.
26proﬁts, including losses, dP∗/P ∗, varying between 0.4 per cent and 3.6 per
cent around the trend rate of 2 per cent. Gross taxable proﬁt( w h e r el o s s e sa r e
set to zero) can be seen to follow a smoothed cycle compared with dP ∗/P∗,
ranging between 1.5 per cent and 2.5 per cent. The eﬀe c to fd e d u c t i o n si st o
generate a proﬁle for net taxable proﬁt growth which lies between the other
two proﬁles — with slower deductions growth in above-trend years causing
net taxable proﬁts to grow faster than the gross equivalent, and vice versa
in below-trend years. The deductions proﬁle in Figure 4 does not display
t h es a m ec y c l i c a lp a t t e r na sp r o ﬁts. This is due to the opposing counter-
cyclical and pro-cyclical eﬀects of capital allowances and losses used within
the deductions total. Setting capital allowances to zero, would yield a regular






123456789 1 0 1 1
Growth of gross profit (incl losses), dP*/P*
Growth of gross taxable profit
Growth of deductions
Growth of net taxable profit, dP(T)/P(T)
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In estimating aggregate behavioural elasticities, CorpSim is used to provide
estimates of αacross all ﬁrms, together with estimates for proﬁtg r o w t ha n d
the aggregate endogenous deductions response, ΩD,P∗.Together with assumed
values for the behavioural responses in (22) this allows ΩPT,t to be calculated.
Figure 5 shows elasticity proﬁles for ΩPT,t over eleven periods for two cases.
In case A parameters are set at the benchmark values in Table 3. In case B,
ΩD,P∗ =1in all periods, so that automatic deductions change endogenously
in proportion to declared proﬁts. This allows the contribution of the endoge-
nous response to be identiﬁed. In both cases, α in (22) is allowed to vary
over the business cycle. The growth of dP ∗/P ∗, for the benchmark cycle is



























































Figure 5: Elasticities Over the Cycle
The aggregate elasticities in Figure 5 are obtained from simulations of
18,000 paired ﬁrms drawn from the initial simulated proﬁt distributions de-
scribed in subsection 4. This yields ﬁrms in either positive proﬁto rl o s s
28which, via the methods for allocating ﬁrms to groups and the tax-minimising
algorithm within groups, determine ﬁrms’ deductions and the extent to which
they are claimed currently or carried forward to future years. The trend and
cyclical growth components then cause ﬁrms’ proﬁts and losses to change
over the years of the simulation.17
First, it can be seen that the elasticity in proﬁle B is approximately
constant over the cycle, implying that the variation observed in proﬁle A is
almost entirely due to cyclical variations in ΩD,P∗; that is, variations in α
over the cycle have minimal eﬀect. In these benchark cases α is around 2
on average across all ﬁrms. The trend level of ΩPT,t is approximately −0.77.
This can be seen using the benchmark values of parameters in Table 3 and
equation (22), in which the aggregate value of α obtained from CorpSim is
around 2 (that is, around half of all gross taxable proﬁts are tax-relieved via
deductions) and ΩD,P∗ ≈ 1 at mid-points in the cycle.18
Comparing proﬁles A and B with proﬁtg r o w t hr a t e ss h o w st h a td u r i n g
above-trend growth, the eﬀect of diﬀerences in ΩD,P∗ are relatively small at
the top of the cycle. The aggregate elasticity, ΩPT,t, reaches around −0.85
(or about 110 per cent of its trend value) in the benchmark case compared
with −0.77 when ΩD,P∗ =1 . This larger absolute value compared with
the benchmark ΩPT,t reﬂects the fact that ΩD,P∗ < 1 during above-trend
growth when there are fewer losses available to be used as proﬁto ﬀ-sets.
However, Figure 5 shows that in recessionary years, when proﬁtg r o w t ho n
average is low, ΩPT,t in proﬁle A deviates noticeably more from proﬁle B,
becoming −0.56, or around 73 per cent of its trend value, at the bottom
of the cycle. This largely reﬂects the impact of especially large increases in
ΩD,P∗ in association with cyclical downturns. The behaviour of ηD,P∗ over
the cycle reﬂects the procyclical charateristics of capital allowance deductions
and the countercyclical characteristics of loss-based deductions. The latter
17These initial simulations use no stochastics; see the sensitivity analyses in the next
section. However, growth rates diﬀer as discussed above. All simulations reported follow
an inital twenty year simulation period which is necessary to prevent ‘initial conditions’
inﬂuencing the trend and cyclical components (for example, as loss pools build up from
zero to trend levels.
18The elasticity produced by CorpSim is not exactly unity at 2 per cent growth because










































Figure 6: Elasticities with a High ProﬁtC y c l e
The asymmetry between booms and recessions arises because the use of
losses as deductions is relatively unimportant in above-trend growth (when
aggregate losses are relatively small) but becomes particularly important in
below-trend growth when losses are larger on average. Because the taxable
proﬁt distribution is eﬀectively truncated below zero, large losses both gen-
erate additional deductions and limit the ability of ﬁrms to claim them until
positive proﬁts return (or they can be shared with group partners in proﬁt).
The asymmetry becomes more pronounced for larger proﬁt cycles, as shown
in Figure 6. The time proﬁle for ΩPT,t using a higher cycle (range: −0.05 per
cent to 4.5 per cent around a 2 per cent trend) can be seen to be quite similar
to the benchmark case during above-trend growth but substantially lower in
absolute terms during below-trend growth. These proﬁtg r o w t hr a t e sa r e
well within the range of rates observed in the UK in practice, with HMRC
data showing annual growth rates for gross taxable proﬁts as high as 18 per
cent and as low as −4 per cent since the early 1990s.
These results suggest an important conclusion for empirical methodolo-
30gies testing for behavioural responses of proﬁts or deductions to tax rate
changes. Namely, in circumstances of trend or above-trend growth, recognis-
ing the impact of automatic changes in deductions may be less important.
However, behavioural responses in recessionary periods could be substan-
tially aﬀected by the extent to which ﬁrms are constrained by the tying of
deductions such as past losses to proﬁts claimed in the home jurisdiction.
6 Sensitivity Analyses
This section considers the eﬀects on the cyclical pattern of the aggregate
elasticity, ηPT,t, of varying a number of the parameters from their bench-
mark values. Subsection 6.1 examines the eﬀects of diﬀerent assumptions
regarding proﬁt and deductions shifting while subsection 6.2 discusses the
role of stochastic changes in relative proﬁt movements. Cyclical changes in
the shifting parameters are examined in subsection 6.3.
6.1 Alternative Shifting Assumptions
Figure 7 shows how the elasticity proﬁles change under diﬀerent assumptions
regarding the extent of shifting. The upper part of the ﬁgure considers diﬀer-
ent values of proﬁt-shifting, Ωθp,t, while the lower part examines the eﬀects
of diﬀerent deductions-shifting elasticities, Ωθd,t. Other benchmark assump-
tions are maintained. It can be seen that, for proﬁt-shifting, changing the
values of the elasticity Ωθp,t causes the ΩPT,t proﬁles to shift non-uniformly.
At the depression part of the cycle, when absolute values of ΩPT,t are rela-
tively small, the shifting due to changed Ωθp,t values is small. The shift is
larger when absolute values of ΩPT,t are larger during the boom periods. This
reﬂects the fact that, since Ωθp,t is a component of ΩP∗,t, and is multiplied
by ΩD,P∗ in (22), this magiﬁes the impact on the tax base elasticity, ΩPT,t.
However, for deductions-shifting there is no such multiplier eﬀect via ΩD,P∗
and therefore the proﬁles shift uniformly when Ωθd,t is changed, regardless of
the point in the cycle.
In general, benchmark or lower response assumptions (for example, Ωθp,t =
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Figure 7: Changing Proﬁt-shifting and Deductions-shifting Assumptions
32However, the higher response assumptions (for example, Ωθp,t = −0.625;
Ωθd,t =0 .5)c a ny i e l dv a l u e so fΩPT,t in excess of −1. In view of the relation-
ship in equation (21), this implies a negative tax elasticity, ΩT,t < 0, which
in turn implies that tax rates are set on the negatively sloped portion of the
corporate tax Laﬀer curve. Such elasticity values are unlikely to hold for
the current UK tax regime. This ﬁnding therefore suggests either that the
lower behavioural responses examined are more likely in practice, or when
automatic eﬀects raise the value of ΩPT,t, ceteris paribus, this may induce
changes in ﬁrms’ discretionary responses, ηθp,t, ηP,t, and so on. Subsection 6.3
considers possible trade-oﬀs between automatic and discretionary responses.
6.2 Allowing for Stochastic ProﬁtG r o w t h
So far it has been assumed that all ﬁrms making positive gross proﬁts grow
at the same rate.19 To capture the possibility of a range of ﬁrm proﬁtg r o w t h
rates, CorpSim incorporates a random growth component.20 Simulations re-
ported below use a variance of proﬁtg r o w t ho f0.0001 around mean growth
as determind by the trend and cycle components. This implies, for exam-
ple, that with 2 per cent trend growth on average, around half of all ﬁrms
experience proﬁt growth outside a 1 to 3 per cent range. This has the eﬀect
of generating an additional source of diﬀerence in ηD,P∗ across ﬁrms, with
resulting diﬀerences in the aggregate equivalent ΩD,P∗.
The resulting time-proﬁle for ΩPT,t i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e8w h e r ei ti sc o m -
pared with the (zero variance) benchmark case. It can be seen that elasticity
values can vary quite considerably especially, but not exclusively, associ-
ated with cyclical downturns during years 6 to 11, when negative proﬁt/loss
growth is more prevalent.21 These results suggest that automatic responses
of deductions to changes in proﬁts declared at home can be quite volatile.
19As explained earlier, and in detail at the end of the appendix, the dynamic process
implies that ﬁr m sw i t hl o s s e se x p e r i e n c ed i ﬀerent growth rates.
20The model can also include the possibility of serial correlation where, for example,
‘success breeds success’, but this phenomenon is not considered here.
21Creedy and Gemmell (2007a, c) show that the built-in ﬂexibility of corporation tax
(the aggregate elasticity of tax revenue with respect to aggregate proﬁts) is also inherently











































Benchmark (with variance = 0.0001)
Figure 8: Allowing for Stochastic Component in ProﬁtG r o w t h
Thus, the ability or willingness of ﬁrms to shift proﬁts abroad may be quite
diﬀerent, depending on the size and growth of their deductions, since these
can only be claimed against proﬁts declared at home. The simulations sug-
gest that these factors may be important at the aggregate level. This is
perhaps not surprising when it is recalled that the vast bulk of corporate tax
revenues in the UK are paid by a small fraction of (large) taxpaying ﬁrms.
Volatility in their proﬁt performances can have a large inﬂuence on aggregate
taxable proﬁt outcomes.
6.3 Cyclical Changes in Real and Shifting Responses
Results reported so far assume that the four aggregate behavioural elastici-
ties (Ωθp,t, ΩP,t, Ωθd,t, Ω0
D,t) remain unchanged in the face of induced changes
in ﬁrms’ abilities to claim deductions due to cyclical factors. Clearly, when
recessionary forces reduce ﬁrms’ deductions claiming (or increase the required
proﬁts declared at home to qualify for those deductions), they may be ex-
pected to react. In particular, they may seek to mitigate cyclical eﬀects by
34increasing or reducing any of the relevant behavioural elasticities.
This could be investigated in the current context by specifying a rela-
tionship between automatic and discretionary responses. However, in the
absense of empirical evidence on the nature and extent of ﬁrms’ behavioural
responses, such modelled relationships would be arbitrary and of unknown
empirical relevance. As an alternative, this subsection considers the changes
in each behavioural response that would be required to keep the tax base
elasticity, ΩPT,t constant, given the automatic changes induced by cyclical
factors; that is, if behavioural changes were aimed to neutralise fully the
automatic cyclical changes. Since CorpSim identiﬁes declared proﬁts, P∗
(rather than total proﬁts, P, and the declared fraction, θp) and similarly for
declared deductions, it is more relevant below to combine real and shifting
responses to consider values of ΩP∗,t and ΩD,t.22
The two discretionary elasticities, ΩP∗,t and ΩD,t, can be obtained in
this case by rearranging equation (22) in aggregate terms. Letting λ =
















where, in each case, the elasticities on the right hand side are held constant
at their benchmark values; the variations are determined by variations in α
and ΩD,P∗.
Results are reported in Table 5 for a complete cycle. These examples
u s et h ep e r i o d1b e n c h m a r kt a xb a s ee l a s t i c i t yo fΩPT,t = −0.77,a ss h o w n
in Figure 5, yielding the benchmark behavioural elasticities ΩP∗,t = −0.43
and ΩD,t =0 .30 in period 1 when the induced response, ΩD,P∗ ≈ 1.23 The
two columns of Table 5 show the values of the discretionary total proﬁt
or deductions responses, using (24) and (25) respectively, which maintain
22Since CorpSim produces values for ΩD,P∗, rather than separate values for ΩD,θp and
ΩD,P, it is not meaningful in this context to consider separate discretionary responses for
θp and P.
23That is ΩP ∗,t = −(0.375 + 0.05),a n dΩD,t =0 .25 + 0.05.
35Table 5: Compensatory Shifting and Real Responses














ΩPT,t = −0.77. It can be seen in column 1, for example, that if ΩP∗,t is
adjusted to compensate fully for cyclical eﬀects, this has to rise (in absolute
terms) to −0.78 at the cyclical low point in period 8 (from −0.43 in period 1).
That is, combined real and shifting proﬁt responses would need to increase by
around 80 per cent. To put this in prespective, recall that a proﬁt response of
−0.43 implies that a 10 per cent increase in the tax rate would cause declared
proﬁt s ,o na v e r a g e ,t of a l lf r o m ,s a y ,80 to 77.T h ev a l u eo f−0.78 implies a
fall from 80 to around 74. Column 2 shows that the equivalent response for
deductions involves a deductions elasticity, ΩD,t,i np e r i o d8m o r et h a n6 0
per cent higher than its value when growth in on-trend, increasing from 0.30
to 0.49.
The changes in the proﬁt and deductions responses in Table 5 are shown
in Figure 9, as precentages of trend values (period 1). This shows that
both the required proﬁt and deduction responses (needed to keep the overall
behavioural response, ΩPT,t, constant) are larger in recessions, reﬂecting the
fact that the positive indirect eﬀect from ΩD,P∗ is greater in recessions and
hence needs a larger discretionary reponse to counteract it. Figure 9 also
shows however that the required change in the proﬁt response is less than that
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Figure 9: Percentage Proﬁt and Deductions Responses
This arises because the indirect eﬀect ΩD,P∗, operating through ΩP∗,t, is less
than unity in above-trend growth but is greater than unity in below-trend
growth. Thus the eﬀect on the proﬁt response is respectively dampened then
magniﬁed, over the cycle, compared with the deductions response.
It is perhaps not surprising that, when recession restricts a ﬁrm’s ability
to shift proﬁts out (due to the greater simultaneous loss of automatic de-
ductions at home), more discretionary deductions should be shifted into the
home jurisdiction. That declared proﬁt ss h o u l db er e d u c e de v e nm o r ei nt h i s
situation is less clear. However this result follows from the condition in (23)
that ΩD,P∗ < α
α−1. Since this condition holds here, reducing declared proﬁts
reduces automatic deductions claiming but by less than the reduction in prof-
its. Hence, reducing declared gross proﬁts also reduces declared net proﬁts,
despite the loss of some automatic deductions. In a recession, shifting prof-
its out (which reduces tax liability) simultaneously shifts a greater amount
of deductions (which increases tax liability) compared with non-recessionary
p e r i o d s .H e n c em o r ep r o ﬁts must be shifted (ΩP∗,t must be higher) in order
37to stop tax liability rising, and keep the overall response, ΩPT,t,c o n s t a n t .
Nevertheless, Table 5 and Figure 9 show that, in a recession, a given overall
behavioural response can be achieved via a smaller change in the deductions
response compared with the proﬁt response.
7 Conclusions
This aim of this paper has been to examine behavioural responses by com-
panies to changes in the taxation of their proﬁts in the home country, and
the possible pattern of such responses over the business cycle. Emphasis
has been on the determinants of the elasticity of corporation tax paid, by
individual ﬁrms and in aggregate, in response to a change in the corporation
tax rate. This elasticity in turn depends crucially on the elasticity of net
or taxable proﬁts with respect to a change in the tax rate. In this respect
the paper may be seen as following the broad agenda set by Feldstein (1995)
when he emphasised the importance of the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the retention, or net-of-tax, rate.
Firms’ responses to tax rate changes can take the form of real responses,
whereby activities are transferred to other tax jurisdictions, and income-
shifting responses in which the location of economic activity is unchanged
but the extent to which proﬁts and deductions are declared in the home
country changes. The present paper has shown that it is also important to
distinguish separate responses of gross proﬁts and of deductions allowable
as proﬁto ﬀ-sets. Where, as in the UK, these deductions are related to
t h es i z eo fc o m p a n i e s ’p r o ﬁts, it is found that allowing for an endogenous,
or automatic, response may be important for empirical estimates of ﬁrms’
overall behavioural responses.
Behavioural responses of corporations to tax changes were therefore ﬁrst
decomposed into four main constituent components, consisting of real and
income-shifting responses of both proﬁts and deductions. The elasticity of
taxable proﬁts with respect to the tax rate was shown to depend on the four
elasticities relating to these responses, along with the ratio of declared proﬁts
to taxable proﬁts. It is also shown how the elasticity of qualifying expen-
38diture with respect to the tax rate depends on the elasticity of qualifying
expenditure with respect to declared proﬁts. This last elasticity, reﬂecting
an endogenous or automatic adjustment of deductions to proﬁt changes, is
shown to play an important role. In producing aggregate measures of the
elasticity of taxable proﬁts with respect to the tax rate over the business
cycle, the automatic responses of deductions to proﬁt changes were obtained
using a range of algorithms designed to ensure that ﬁrms minimise taxation.
These algorithms are contained in the microsimulation model CorpSim,
which generates the changing distribution of proﬁt sf o ral a r g en u m b e ro f
corporations over the business cycle.
The elasticity of aggregate taxable proﬁts with respect to the tax rate
was shown to be pro-cyclical, being in absolute terms at a maximum when
aggregate proﬁtg r o w t hi sa tam a x i m u m ,a n da na b s o l u t em i n i m u mi nt h e
depths of the depression part of the business cycle. Importantly, the variation
f o u n di nt h ee l a s t i c i t yo ft a x a b l ep r o ﬁts with respect to the tax rate was
found to be almost entirely due to cyclical variations in the endogenous or
automatic component mentioned above, regarding the elasticity of deductions
with respect to declared proﬁts.
The variation in the elasticity of taxable proﬁts with respect to the tax
rate was not, however, symmetric, being greater in periods of depression.
This asymmetry between booms and recessions arises because the use of
losses as deductions is relatively unimportant in above-trend growth (when
aggregate losses are relatively small) but becomes particularly important in
below-trend growth when losses are larger on average. Because the taxable
proﬁt distribution is eﬀectively truncated below zero, large losses both gen-
erate additional deductions and limit the ability of ﬁrms to claim them until
positive proﬁts return (or they can be shared with group partners in proﬁt).
The asymmetry increases as the amplitude of the proﬁt cycle increases.
The implication of these ﬁndings for empirical attempts to measure be-
havioural responses of proﬁts or deductions to tax rate changes is that in
circumstances of trend or above-trend growth, recognising the impact of au-
tomatic changes in deductions may be relatively less important. However,
behavioural responses in recessionary periods could be substantially aﬀected
39by the extent to which ﬁrms are constrained by the tying of deductions such
as past losses to proﬁts claimed in the home jurisdiction.
When a stochastic component of proﬁt changes for individual ﬁrms was
introduced in the simulations, the resulting time-proﬁle for the elasticity of
taxable proﬁts with respect to the tax rate was found to vary quite consid-
erably. This variability was especially, but not exclusively, associated with
cyclical downturns. These results suggest that automatic responses of deduc-
tions to changes in proﬁts declared at home can be quite volatile. Thus, the
ability or willingness of ﬁrms to shift proﬁts abroad may be quite diﬀerent,
depending on the size and growth of their deductions, since these can only
be claimed against proﬁts declared at home. The simulations suggest that
these factors may be important at the aggregate level.
The results therefore emphasis the need to allow for automatic changes
in deductions in response to changes in declared proﬁts, and the value of a
microsimulation model which is capable of generating a changing distribution
of proﬁts over time and, importantly, can allow for the complex way in which
ﬁrms, as members of groups for tax purposes, arrange their deductions in
order to minimise tax paid.
40Appendix: Simulating Proﬁt Distributions
This appendix provides further details of the CorpSim model. As mentioned
above, the model deals with declared proﬁts, equivalent to P∗ values, but for
convenience the ∗ supercript is omitted from the following. To avoid the
problems of dealing with negative values, the approach is ﬁrst to convert
proﬁts into a positive variable, xt,w h e r et is a time subscript:
xt = Pt + dt (26)
and a choice must therefore be made regarding the shift parameter, dt.
Proﬁt Distributions
In view of the form of the empirical distribution of trading proﬁts, a func-
tional form such as the lognormal distribution, which is widely used in analy-
ses of incomes, is unable to capture the shape of the distribution of PA+d.24
The approach taken here is thus to use a mixture distribution, deﬁned as
follows. In general, a mixture distribution, M (x), is deﬁn e do nt h er a n -
dom variable, x, as a linear combination of H independent distributions,





where βi deﬁnes the proportion of density mass associated with the ith distri-
bution. The use of a mixture distribution, in contrast to the search for a much
more complex functional form of a single distribution that can handle the
observed characteristics, has several advantages. First, relatively simple dis-
tributions can be combined intuitively in order to match particular features
of an empirical distribution. Second, relatively straightforward analytical re-
sults can be derived for summary measures, despite the overall complexity
of the form of the mixture, where well-established analytical results exist for
the constituent distributions.25
24The lognormal is deﬁned only for positive values, so that PA+d is the relevant variable,
rather than PA.
25On the use of (conditional) mixture distributions to handle observed bimodality of the
personal income distribution, and changes over time, see Bakker and Creedy (1999).
41The following speciﬁcation, involving a mixture of four distributions, is
adopted here for trading proﬁts. A proportion β1 of the density of PA + d
is modelled using a lognormal distribution Λ(μ1,σ 2
1),i nw h i c hσ2
1 is rela-
tively large to capture a platykurtic or ﬂat feature. This has relatively low
kurtosis and thus captures the more central portion of the distribution. To
capture the leptokurtic, or peaked, feature, a proportion β2 is modelled us-
ing a lognormal distribution Λ(μ2,σ2
2) in which σ2
2 is relatively small. In the
following analysis, μ1 = μ2. However, the use of just these two distributions
d o e sn o tc a p t u r et h ev e r yl o n gt a i l so ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o n .H e n c eaf u r t h e rt w o
component distributions are used. The ﬁrst forms a proportion, β3,o ft h e
density and consists of the upper tail of yet another lognormal distribution,
Λ
¡
PA + d>ξ|μ3,σ 2
3
¢
,w h e r eμ3 and σ2
3 are both relatively large. Hence this
applies only to values of PA + d above the threshold, ξ.T h ei m p o r t a n c eo f
this third distribution lies in the fact that the upper tail of the proﬁtd i s t r i -
bution is responsible for the bulk of corporation tax payments. These same
high proﬁt ﬁrms are then matched (in groups for tax purposes) with large loss
making ﬁrms, where values are obtained from the left hand tail of another
lognormal distribution where a much higher value of d is used.
Analysis of the distribution of loan-relationship proﬁt sr e v e a l st h a ti td o e s
not have the long tails of the distribution of trading (source A) proﬁts. Hence
a mixture distribution involving just two lognormal distributions is used,
with proportions of the densities set at β1 and β2 + β3 for the platykurtic
and leptokurtic components respectively.
Changes in Proﬁts Over the Cycle
Given, as before, xt = Pt+dt, the basic assumption regarding growth is that
xt i ss u b j e c tt oag r o w t hr a t em a d eu po fas y s t e m a t i cc o m p o n e n t ,gt,a n da
random component, ut.T h et subscript on g allows the systematic growth of
proﬁts to vary in some way over time, along with the minimum proﬁt. Thus
x is speciﬁed to change according to:
xt = xt−1 (1 + gt + ut) (28)
42Furthermore, serial correlation implies that:
ut = γut−1 + vt (29)
and v is assumed to be Normally distributed as N (0,σ 2
v). In terms of Pt,
(28) becomes:
Pt + dt =( Pt−1 + dt−1)(1+gt + ut) (30)
and rearrangement gives:
Pt = Pt−1 (1 + gt + ut) − (dt − dt−1)+dt−1 (gt + ut) (31)
This is the basic equation describing the systematic (gt, dt) and stochastic
(ut) processes generating the changing proﬁt level of each ﬁrm, and hence the
changing distribution of proﬁts over time. It is completed by the speciﬁcation
of the time-proﬁles of gt and dt.
The growth rate, gt, is composed of a constant component, g∗, represent-
ing trend real growth, and a real cyclical component, gc
t. This cyclical aspect
can be described by an amplitude of ag and a wavelength of wg.U s i n gas i n e












Similarly, suppose that the proportional rate of change in d (the maximum
loss) from one period to the next consists of a ﬁxed term, ˙ d∗, and a cyclical
component, ˙ dc









The cyclical component similarly has an amplitude of ad and a wavelength










This captures the notion that the extent of maximum losses can also behave
cyclically; for example, in a recession when proﬁt growth is lower on average,
maximum losses are likely to become larger.
43The above model then needs to be extended to deal with the fact that
ﬁrms obtain proﬁts from two sources, A and B. These two income sources
give rise to proﬁts of PA and PB, with corresponding values of xA = PA+dA
and xB = PB +dB. Starting from a given initial joint distribution of proﬁts,
such that there is some correlation, ρ, between A and B proﬁts, it is necessary
to generate proﬁt ﬂows in subsequent periods. The following sequence is used.
First, the random component of proportional changes for the A source is
given, where vA








To allow for the possibility that stochastic shocks to A and B may be corre-



























































































Separate growth cycles, corresponding to (32) and (34) are then be speciﬁed
for each of the terms gA
t , dA
t ,a n ds oo n .
ProﬁtG r o w t hR a t e s
I nt h ea b o v em o d e li ti si m p o r t a n tt or e c o g n i s et h a tt h ea b s e n c eo fas t o -
chastic component of proportionate changes in proﬁts does not imply that
all proﬁts grow at the same rate. Consider a single proﬁt source where, as
above, Pt = xt−dt,w i t hx and d growing at rates δ and θ respectively. These
44rates diﬀer because the growth cycles of x and d a r ee x p e c t e dt ob eo u to f
phase — in boom periods with relatively high δ it is likely that θ is relatively






(δ − θ) (40)
For large proﬁtm a k e r st h et e r mdt−1/Pt−1 is low and hence the growth rate
of proﬁts is similar at δ. However, for loss-makers, −1 <d t−1/Pt−1 < ∞.
For the largest loss makers dt−1/Pt−1 is close to unity and the growth rate of
proﬁts is close to θ.
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